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The Philosophical Case for the Commercial Republic
Gordon Lloyd
Dockson Emeritus Professor of Public Policy, Pepperdine University
Senior Fellow, Ashbrook Center

Ironically, Charles Beard both reviled and revived The Federalists. Douglass
Adair has shown that Federalist 10 was rarely cited in the 19th century, and
argues that thus Beard made it more important than it really was. My question
would be different: why did Federalist 10 disappear for so long when it was, in
fact, crucial to the entire creation of the commercial republic? But that is a
question for another day. Beard was correct to make Federalist 10 important; he
understood that economics were common and durable issues of faction to
Madison. But Beard interpreted that essay through a sort of Marxist reductionist
lens: know the economic holdings of the Framers and you know their ideas.
Martin Diamond argued persuasively against Beard’s reductionist argument, but
ended up saying that the Framers were insufficiently ancient and thus were solid
but “low.” In the end, both Beard and Diamond agreed that America was illfounded for the very same reason: our founders created a commercial republic.
I want to make the case for the Commercial Republic against a framework of
distrust on bot sides of the spectrum.
Federalist 51 provides the institutional or constitutional framework for the
operation of Federalist 10. There is nothing in The Federalist to encourage the
direct will of the people ruling; they instead appeal to the deliberate sense of the
community. That is what Madison means by the rule of law rather than the rule
of men. The latter was seen as the very essence of tyranny. But for the
Progressives the institutional framework was a mere façade for the rule of the
upper over the lower class. The objective was to win the battle for democracy.
Interestingly, on might have expected that Jefferson would have loomed large in
the heroic figures of the Progressives. Wasn’t he the democrat par excellence of
the Founding? He authored the Declaration of Independence and was absent for
the creation of the Constitution. Yet, while Jefferson might have been a democrat,
for Progressives, he had an under developed understanding of democracy.
Namely, he put his emphasis on individual freedom and not social justice. Didn’t
he oppose the upper class system being proposed by Hamilton? Yes, but the
Progressives think they can cure Hamiltonianism of upper classism and keep his
nationalism. The solution is a national democracy.
I am going to suggest that historians have misplaced the difference between
Hamilton and Jefferson as the great divide in American politics. One
consequence is that we see the battle for America as agrarianism over against
capitalism. This is another of the mistakes that historians make: import a
European model to interpret America.
Federalist 10 does say that the most common and durable source of faction is the
property question. And that is what makes a conversation between the Founding

and the Progressives possible. For Locke and Smith, private property is a
legitimate reward for personal effort. It also leads to the improvement of the
human condition. For Rousseau and Marx, private property is theft and the
symbol of human alienation. Linked to the property question is what is the
proper role of government? For Marx, all politics and government is about
power. And power ultimately is economic power, which, in turn, is about the few
who own and the many who don’t own property.
There is thus a link to Lincoln and the Civil War and to the amended
Constitution. The progressives play up the notion that the origin of real progress
in America is constitutionalized by the 13th Amendment, which prohibits one
human being to own another human being. At issue is whether or not that
amendment is seen as a reversal of the ill-founded nation or as the fulfillment of
a well-founded nation. Lincoln replaces both Jefferson and Hamilton as the
Founders of modern America where human rights are more important than
property rights. Thus, the Declaration becomes more important than the
Constitution; if anything the Constitution is a reaction to the Declaration.
But once you have passed the 13th and then the 14th and the 15th amendment
what is there for you to do and what is the lesson for the next generation?
Hamilton is a half-hero of the Progressives because they see him as a nationalist
willing to use the power of the federal government. The economic theory of
Beard is a mild form of class war and that social question is at the heart of the
Progressive approach to politics. It is class war stupid. And certainly with the
Progressives equality replaces liberty as the central concern of politics. The role
of the federal government is to regulate interstate commerce, thus the ICC and
the emergence of the three new cabinet departments.
So the Progressives are against the improved science of politics AND the
extended commercial republic. Thus they think that America is ill founded. They
would rather have a parliamentary system governed by a centralized
administration and a society that holds to the values of social justice or
communal freedom than individual liberty, which seems to reinforce the selfish
side of human nature. Competition implies market failure, whereas government
intervention suggests government solution. And there is no sense saying that
local government is better because, according to the Progressives, the great
social problems do not recognize state boundaries. Thus, in addition to the
separation of powers and checks and balances, the Progressives have no affinity
for federalism.
For Progressives, coordination rather than competition leads to good outcomes
and leadership is linked to the notion of knowledge. There is a Progressive
inkling that there is a body of knowledge that can be certified by an advanced
degree somehow independent from special or personal interests. These public
servants will seek the common good, and since commerce and the common good
do not go together, it is the job of government to reign in the self interested few
who would shaft us unsuspecting and innocent many.

John Locke and the Commercial Republic
What joins commerce or trade on the one side with republic and law on the other
side is the centrality of consent and contracts as normal parts of human living.
People have been exchanging goods and services for centuries, but it is only
when money replaces barter that money making becomes defensible and
commerce emerges as a way of life. Similarly, while the word republic has been
around in the heads of philosophers and the statesmen of Rome for centuries, it
is only when contrasted with monarchy that the word becomes clearer. The
attachment to public things inherent in the word republic is best understood in
terms of its opposite, namely an attachment to private things. By the 17th
century, republicanism was seen as the alternative to monarchy or absolute rule
by one person for his or her own private interest. The rallying cry for republics
was that the rule of law should replace the rule of man.
But it is not obvious that commerce and republic should be joined together.
After all, the Peoples Republic, Socialist Republic, Islamic Republic, and
Protestant Republic have all existed and they are all suspicious of the
commercial way of life. And one can at least imagine widespread commercial
activity taking place in 19th century Victorian England and 21st Century
Communist China.
We could begin our study of the commercial republic with Plato’s Republic and
his remarks about a commercial regime being a city fit for pigs in contrast to the
best regime run by philosophers rather than wage-earners. We could then turn
to Aristotle’s Politics, where we learn that the management of the household
(oikos-nomos) is an inferior activity to the governing of the polis and that there
are certain economic activities more in accordance with nature than others. In
particular, making money off of money is an unnatural act, whereas farming with
an eye to self-sufficiency is praiseworthy. We could then work our way through
Aquinas and beyond and discuss such concepts as the just price, the just wage,
and further criticisms over the deadly sins that emerge from devoting too much
attention to the life of the body and the secular world. Such a study would reveal
two important points: 1) the case had to be made in favor of a commercial
republic, and 2) there is something unsatisfying about the modern commercial
republic regardless of whether that springs from attachment to ancient virtues
or post-modern values.
We begin our coverage of the commercial republic with the late 17th century
work of John Locke. The dominant theme in Locke’s work is that improvement in
the material condition of mankind is both possible and desirable. With the help
of the discoveries of modern science generally and of Rene Descartes, Isaac
Newton, and Francis Bacon particularly, Locke presented a view of human
progress and the transformation of nature that was unknown to the ancients.
And Locke argued that this could best be achieved by challenging the existing
mixed economic system of mercantilism and feudalism and the notion that

monarchs had that divine right to rule and be obeyed absolutely, and by insisting
that there should be a separation of church and state.

Unlike the classicists and the post-moderns, Locke envisioned the essential unit
of analysis to be the autonomous individual in a state of nature free from social
restraints and governmental regulations. Locke portrayed this fundamental
natural position of humans to be one of abject poverty. Nevertheless, since God
gave the world to man to enjoy and improve rather than to simply suffer and
starve, those who are rational and industrious in taking care of themselves by
ploughing the land and investing in the useful arts and sciences are to be held in
the highest esteem. Private property is the source of human improvement. True,
God gave the world in to man common, but it is through the privatization of this
property that the general wellbeing is advanced. Accordingly, the acquisition of
private property is natural rather than suspect (as the ancients would claim) or
down right theft (as the post-moderns would challenge).
But Locke didn’t stop with a defense of private property as 1) a legitimate
reward for honest and productive labor and 2) an opportunity to invest the
surplus product for personal profit. He went beyond offering an alternative to
the mercantilist theory of production of and the aristocratic distribution of
property according to the law of primogeniture. He went beyond a defense of
commerce broadly understood. He actually challenged the traditional answer to
the political question of who should rule. Locke seriously undermined not only
primogeniture in the economic world but also the divine right of kings in the
political world. Legitimate government came into existence by the consent of
autonomous individuals who willingly surrendered the right to adjudicate
disputes and reluctantly gave up the power to make laws that were necessary
and proper for the well-being of the community. Locke brooks no idea that the
rights of the people came from the government; rather the powers of the
government were a limited grant by the people out of necessity. All the better to
separate the powers of government and limit the reach of government to
specified objects with the people retaining control over the vast areas of their
life.
The critique of the Commercial Society suggests that the very term is an
oxymoron. How can a monetary economy based on exchange and investment for
profit produce an outcome where the public good is served? Moreover, it rests
on the assumption that competition actually exists in both spheres and produces
a fair outcome. But experience proves that the economy does not work in this
imaginary way, and thus a government can’t be limited to enforcing the rule of
law against the theft of property and the abuse of power. The government,
particularly a democratically inclined government, must control commerce so
that it works on behalf of the people rather than advancing the interests of the
few. The new case for government is not the classical claim of molding
(re)public(an) virtue, but the claim that government is to secure the equal claim
to happiness.

Adam Smith and the American Founding
Smith built on the Lockean foundation that the human condition was capable of
improvement by individual initiative. Smith focused on improving the human
condition by increasing the wealth of the nation. Poverty was to be solved by
increasing production, which, in turn depended on the productivity of labor,
which was strongly influenced by the division or specialization of labor, and that
depended on the extent of the market.
But Smith made a correction to Locke that gave commerce an even greater
moral support. Human beings not only have a natural inclination to self
preservation and thus have the right to the means to self preservation; the
butcher, the baker, and the brewer also have a natural inclination to “truck,
barter, and exchange” beef, bread, and beer with other human beings. No
“human wisdom” was needed to create this situation; the “propensity “ to
cooperate with others is a vital part of a commercial or civilized society. In
seeking the cooperation of others, however, we do not appeal to their generosity,
“but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their
advantages. Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly upon the
benevolence of his fellow-citizens.”
In the Wealth of Nations, Smith presents his System of Natural Liberty where a
commercial society if left to its own devices produces both improvement and
equilibrium. Smith wrote, contra Rousseau, that the practical arts and sciences
actually lead to the improvement of society and that there is a natural progress
from a primitive agricultural community to an advanced, or “civilized and
thriving country.”
In the final two books of the Wealth of Nations, Smith addresses the question of
what government should do that is consistent with the Natural System of Liberty.
He distinguishes between a Mercantile system of political economy, where the
government is extensively involved in the day to day operations of production
and the granting of special privileges to a few companies, and a commercial
society where the government is limited to a few essential operations and the
market operates in the area of production, distribution, and exchange. This
defense of an active market against an active government is what John Stuart
Mill called the system of laissez faire in 1848 and what von Hayek called the
system of free enterprise in the 20th century. The presumption through the
centuries is that individuals know what is best for themselves and that the
market system works favorably. The government should resist the urge to
interfere against the contrary defense of government action which points to
market failure as justification for involvement.
There is a common thread that runs through the defense and critique of the
commercial society. In many ways it turns on the role of human wisdom. From
Smith to Hayek and Friedman there is the suspicion that human wisdom is
incapable of planning and anticipating what should be produced. On the other
hand, there is a strong presumption from the Mercantislists through the

Progressives that selfless administrators can be educated to determine the level
and kind of production necessary for an efficiently run economy.
The other problem that needs to be considered is whether a commercial society
promotes personal greed at the expense of a concern for the public welfare. How
is it possible that a concern with self-interest in fact leads to desirable outcomes?
How scientific is it to say that an invisible hand somehow works to unintended
actions into favorable outcomes? This sounds like an economics of flashing
mirrors. The defense from Locke through Smith to Hayek and Friedman is that a
concern with self-interest is not the same as personal greed or self-indulgence. A
commercial society requires its habitants to learn the values of hard work, thrift,
and moderation. On the contrary says Smith “I have never known much good
done by those who affected to trade for the public good.” To borrow from
Tocqueville, the heavy hand of government involvement in the day-to-day lives
of the people is likely to turn self-reliant citizens into obedient sheep or
permanently dependent children.
The Federalists followed the Smith model in its effort to control rather than
eliminate faction. The wellbeing of the nation depended on the presence of
religious, political, and economic liberty. These liberties in turn required the
encouragement of a variety of opinions, passions, and interests, and these in turn
depended greatly on the encouragement of a commercial society across an
extended territory. Commerce is not just tolerated; it is embraced.
This leads us to emphasize what is critical in the origin and development of the
commercial republic. Commerce is deemed to be vital for the preservation of
economic, political, and religious liberty. At the heart of commerce is not only
the idea of trade and exchange, but also competition. It is through the
competition of firms and industries for the support of the consumer that
economic liberty is secured. Similarly, the competition of the separate branches
of government and different levels of government, augmented by frequent and
fair elections helps secure political freedom. And linked to this is the notion that
religious liberty is strongly influence by the competition between a vast number
and variety of religious sects for the support of the “religious consumer.”
The American Founding and the Commercial Republic
Perhaps the greatest contribution of The Federalist was that republicanism could
be—in fact must be—operated on a scale not previously imagined. The “oracle”
Montesquieu, for example, argued that republics could only thrive in small and
homogeneous communities where people knew each other and had a sufficient
range of experiences in common to care for the public things. To be sure,
Montesquieu had supported federalism and the separation of powers, but he saw
these republican institutions as auxiliaries to the social infrastructure of a small
and homogeneous society where the inhabitants were involved as citizens and
thus their public virtue was vital. But such small communities were not
conducive to the encouragement of a variety of interest. The Federalist
“corrected” Montesquieu by arguing that the republican institutions will work

even better in a large republic than in a small one. That is the whole point to
Federalist 10 and 51.
Madison put it this way in Federalist 51: “If all men were angels, no government
would be necessary.” We add, if all men were beasts, free government would be
impossible. Thus free government presupposes a sufficient degree of virtue in
the people that, when supported by institutional and economic competition, the
republican principle of “the deliberate sense of the community” will prevail.
There is no temptation in Madison to transform men into angels or to eliminate
the causes of faction.
We have said that the very idea of republicanism in the modern world is to
replace the arbitrary distribution of economic and political power with a
reasonable criteria, the evidence for truthfulness of which appears obvious to
the reasonable person. The conventional law of primogeniture and monarchical
rule were deemed to be self evidently false by the standard of nature. The rule of
law is better than the rule of man. That is the key to the modern case for
republicanism. One might add that the rule of markets –the law of demand and
supply—is better than the rue of men in the economic realm. So it is not as
unnatural as might first appear that commerce and republicanism belong
together. A modern republic is designed to protect the rights of individuals and
not just the rights of the few or the many. Modern republicanism does not stress
the pre-existence and importance of a common good. Nor is it willing to rely
simply on the voice of the people as the expression of a common good. Modern
republicanism has a Constitution which species the powers of government, the
rights of individuals, as well as the powers and limitations of the majority of the
people. To be sure, this institutional arrangement receives its continued
legitimacy from frequent and fair popular elections as well as the super
majoritarian amendment process.
Let’s take a look at the Constitutional support for a commercial republic. And
let’s look at the document more innocently than did Charles Beard did. Let’s take
the language seriously. And let’s ponder two central questions: 1) what does the
Constitution have to say about republicanism? and 2) what is commercial about
the Constitution and the republic it establishes?
It is far easier to answer the first question than the second and we need not
delay too long to pursue the second question. According to the Framers, a
republican form of government is where a) a scheme of representation takes
place in contrast to both a monarch and a (pure) democracy; b) there is a
separation of powers between the legislature and executive branches; c) the
judicial branch is independent from the political branches; and d) the legislative
branch is bicameral rather than unicameral. There is also e) a provision for
frequent elections by the people, but there is room for debate about the mode of
election, the length of term of office, whether terms of office should be staggered,
and who can vote and who can run for office. There is also f) provision for the
removal of a party from office.

1). Article One, Section six indicates that “Senators and Representatives shall
receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out
of the Treasury of the United States.” I think this underscores the commercial
nature of the republic. As Ben Franklin reminded the delegates at the
Philadelphia Convention, and political thinkers from Aristotle to Montesquieu
argued, a republic required a deep attachment to public service by both the
citizens and statesmen. The thought of paying someone to serve the public was
certainly untraditional. But that is what the Framers proposed. Now, that did not
mean that the electorate and the elected were to be motivated simply by money;
rather it meant that it is appropriate to pay someone for services rendered and
we can always refuse to hire them again by means of frequent elections. Besides,
paying a House member or senator for their service certainly broadens the pool
of who can be elected.
The Framers realized that paying the representatives could also lead to abuse.
Thus in Article 2, Section 1, the President shall not receive a pay increase until
after the next Presidential election. This move was an attempt to check the
potentiality for corruption in the executive branch. Similarly in Article 3, Section
1, the judges shall be compensated for their services, but their pay shall not be
reduced while in office. This is an attempt to secure the independence of the
judiciary.
2) Article 1, Section 7 that “all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives.” This clause is grounded in an American axiom of
republican liberty: no taxation without representation.
3) Among the 18 clauses Article One, Section 8 outlining the powers of Congress,
there are at least six that deal directly with a commercial society.
A) There was close to unanimous at the Constitutional Convention that
Congressional action under the Articles of Confederation was impeded by the
unavailability of a regular source of funding and borrowing. Thus the delegates
agreed to grant the power to tax and borrow to Congress under the new
Constitution (see Article 1, section 8, clauses 1 and 2).
But what if Congress abused this power? One answer is that power is limited to
public policy that supports the general welfare and common defense. But what if
these two clause are used as invitations to expand the role of government rather
than to limit the role of government? What policy can’t be justified in the name
of the general welfare or common defense? The Framers’ answer is that
ultimately the people themselves initially through regular elections and
ultimately through the amendment process must express their “deliberate
sense” on the issue. Whether one interprets these clauses loosely or strictly has
had a huge impact on the kind of commercial society and republican government
that has unfolded in the United States. For example, the New Deal and Great
Society programs in the 20th century and Obamacare in the 21st century owe
much to a broad constitutional interpretation of these clauses.

B) The most famous is Article 1, Section 8, clause three known popularly as the
interstate commerce clause. The clause granting Congress the power to “regulate
commerce…among the several states” is vital to the creation and preservation of
an interstate commercial republic over an extended territory. But what exactly
does this clause mean and has its meaning changed over time? Is it possible to
draw a clear line between intrastate and interstate commerce as the Supreme
Court in the new Deal era attempted to do? What exactly constitutes commerce?
Does Chief Justice John Marshall’s decision in McCulloch v Maryland settle the
issue for good? Again, the New Deal, the Great Society, and Obamacare programs
relied on a very expansive rather than a restrictive interpretation of the meaning
of this clause.
The Progressives in the late 19th and early 20th century relied on this clause to
regulate the relationship between capital and labor and support the
development of labor union activity. The Progressives also provided a
significant challenge to the traditional understanding of the role of government
in a commercial republic. They introduced three new cabinet departments that
were directly responsible for regulating the three sectors of the economy: the
Agriculture Department, the Labor Department, and the Commerce Department.
The roles of these departments have expanded over the last hundred years in an
effort to control rather than encourage the operation of a commercially based
republic.

